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Calibrating Chromatography: How Tswett Broke the Experimenters’ Regress 
 
In this paper, we propose a new account of calibration according to which calibrating a 
technique (or instrument) is to show that the technique (or instrument) does what it is 
supposed to do. In other words, calibration establishes that a technique (or instrument) 
works as intended. To motivate our account of calibration, we examine an early 20th 
century debate between Mikhail Tswett (1872-1919) and Leon Marchlewski (1869-1946) 
about chlorophyll chemistry and the appropriate methods for investigating it. Tswett was 
a botanist whose interest in chlorophyll led him to develop chromatographic adsorption 
analysis (hereafter, CAA), a separation technique in physical chemistry.1 Marchlewski 
was a prominent chlorophyll chemist who was highly critical of Tswett and his 
chromatographic method. In this paper, we focus on experiments that Tswett conducted 
to address Marchlewski’s concern that the process of CAA altered the chemical character 
of chlorophyll. We argue that Tswett’s experiments established that CAA was reliable in 
the special case of chlorophyll without relying on either a theory of CAA or a standard 
calibration experiment, which would have involved applying CAA to a mixture of known 
character (a surrogate signal) and verifying that CAA yielded the correct analysis. We 
then offer a guess as to Tswett’s reasoning. We suggest that Tswett relied on material 
facts in the common ground for chemists at the time. By appealing to local material facts 
accepted by chemists at the time, Tswett answered his critic’s complaint that his appeals 
to CAA were viciously circular and broke the Experimenters’ Regress. We further 
suggest that Tswett did not conduct a standard calibration experiment because the 
                                                 
1 Chromatography is usually defined as a physical separation technique in which a sample (the analyte) is 
distributed between a stationary phase (solid or liquid) and a mobile phase (liquid or gas). Separation 
occurs because the parts of the sample are differentially adsorbed. 
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material assumptions required to secure the reliability of CAA by way of a standard 
calibration experiment would have seemed dubious to chemists at the time.  
 Tswett developed CAA in 1902-1903. In subsequent years, he published several 
papers in which he used CAA to study the chemistry of chlorophyll, but the wider 
scientific community did not accept his technique as reliable until the 1930s. Livengood 
(2009) reviews a dozen explanations suggested in earlier literature for the initial rejection 
of Tswett’s chromatography. He argues that chromatography was premature in the sense 
that it could not be properly connected with either entrenched chemical and botanical 
theories or entrenched laboratory practices.2 In defending his generalized prematurity 
explanation of the rejection of chromatography, Livengood considers an alternative 
explanation that he attributes to Clark Glymour and Balázs Gyenis. According to 
Livengood (2009, 66-67), Glymour and Gyenis suggested in conversation that 
chromatography was initially rejected because Tswett did not carry out a calibration 
experiment showing that CAA produced similar results to entrenched techniques on 
samples of known character. Hereafter, we will use the label s-calibration to denote an 
experiment of the sort suggested by Glymour and Gyenis: one in which a new technique 
(or instrument) is applied to a standard or surrogate signal so that the deliverances of the 
technique may be checked. Granting that Tswett did not carry out an s-calibration 
experiment, Livengood argues that Tswett did calibrate his technique in a way that better 
fit his problem. 
                                                 
2 “Rejection” here is to be interpreted loosely, since it is unlikely that most of the relevant scientists passed 
a negative judgment against chromatography so much as that they didn’t know about it or simply ignored 
it.  
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 The present paper expands on Livengood’s story by connecting Tswett’s 
development of chromatography with the Experimenters’ Regress and the Material 
Theory of Induction.3 In Section 1, we discuss the problem of determining the number 
and properties of the parts of “raw chlorophyll” that occupied Tswett’s attention in the 
last fifteen years of his life, and we describe the technique that Tswett developed in order 
to solve the problem as well as the experiments he performed in defense of his 
technique.4 In Section 2 we discuss the Experimenters’ Regress and its relationship to 
challenges Tswett faced from two of his contemporaries: Willstätter and Marchlewski, 
and we argue that Tswett could not have broken the Regress by appealing to any “theory 
of the instrument” then available to him. In Section 3 we provide a detailed explanation 
of why Tswett did not carry out an s-calibration experiment. We argue that s-calibration 
would not have answered the only relevant objection to his technique as applied to 
chlorophyll. In the historical circumstances, it would have been unreasonable to assume 
that the character of chlorophyll was suitably similar to the character of any surrogate 
sample. Hence,  s-calibration would not have addressed the worry that adsorption 
analysis somehow altered the character of the chlorophyll and so would not have broken 
the Experimenters’ Regress. We then show how Tswett in fact broke the Regress by way 
                                                 
3 See Collins (1985), Collins (1994), Culp (1995), Franklin (1994), and Radder (1992) for early work on 
the Experimenters’ Regress. See Norton (2003), Norton (2011), and Norton (forthcoming) for details on the 
Material Theory of Induction. 
4 We use the expression “raw chlorophyll” to denote the mixture of pigments that gives leaves their color. 
Botanists and chemists today reserve “chlorophyll” for the green parts of what we call raw chlorophyll. 
Tswett acknowledges this distinction in his 1903 paper, writing, “It is well known that the term chlorophyll 
refers, and should refer exclusively, to the complex group of pigments, soluble in alcohol, to which 
vegetation owes its specific coloring” (8). For Tswett, “chlorophyll” is composed of (at least) five 
pigments, two of which are the “chlorophylls (chlorophyll α and β).” Tswett (1907b, 137) remarks again on 
the terminological problem, writing, “With justification or not, the supposed ‘green component’ of 
chlorophyll (also inexplicably referred to as chlorophyll) is generally regarded as the physiologically most 
important coloring material of the leaves.” 
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of experiments he did perform. In Section 4 we argue that Tswett’s case gives us reason 
to want a broader account of calibration. On a narrow account according to which 
calibration just is s-calibration, it seems that either calibration could not have served its 
epistemic function in Tswett’s case or CAA simply could not have been calibrated with 
respect to chlorophyll. Accepting that we ought to give a broader account, we suggest 
looking to the epistemic function of calibration for theoretical guidance. We then propose 
an account of calibration according to which a calibration experiment is any experiment 
designed to show that an instrument does what it is supposed to do.  
 
 
Section 1: The Explanatory Problem: Tswett and Chromatography 
 
For most of his professional life, Tswett was concerned with the chemistry of chlorophyll 
and its role in photosynthesis. The problems of chlorophyll chemistry were well-
established. In 1864, George Stokes sent a very brief communication to the Royal 
Society, which included some “remarks on the Constitution of Chlorophyll.” In his note, 
Stokes says that he has been working for some time on the optical and chemical 
properties of chlorophyll. He writes, “I find the chlorophyll of land-plants to be a mixture 
of four substances, two green and two yellow, all possessing highly distinctive optical 
properties.” As the nineteenth century ended, botanists and botanically-minded chemists 
knew that raw chlorophyll was a mixture of several distinct chemical compounds. 
However, no one knew the exact number of compounds, the proportions in which they 
occurred, their individual chemical structures and properties, and whether the answers to 
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these questions were different for different kinds of plant.5  Tswett (1906d, 388) 
emphasized the application of CAA to the problem of determining the number of the 
parts of raw chlorophyll, writing: “The green pigment of leaves, chlorophyll, is 
recognized as a pigment mixture of varying complexity as attacked by different 
investigators. Chromatographic analysis is qualified to finally determine the degree of 
this complexity.”6 Other chlorophyll researchers of the period, including Richard 
Willstätter (1872-1942), the winner of the 1915 Nobel Prize in Chemistry “for his 
researches on plant pigments, especially chlorophyll,” used a physical separation 
technique called fractional partitioning. But fractional partitioning is a difficult process, 
requiring large amounts of time, effort, and analyzable material. By 1902, Tswett was on 
the lookout for an alternative method and (perhaps) owing to his botanical training he 
found one. 
 Tswett had argued in his doctoral dissertation that chlorophyll was bound to plant 
leaves by adsorption. In 1902, he experimented with some 150 different adsorbent 
materials in an effort to formulate a general law of adsorption, which would further his 
understanding of the binding process in plants.7 He never discovered any law of 
adsorption, but his research led him to discover a simple and powerful physical 
separation technique that he immediately applied to the problems of chlorophyll 
chemistry, confirming “in a new, original way the view of Stokes” (Willstätter, 1915, 
                                                 
5 See Peirce (1903, 51-58) for a prospective look at the problems of chlorophyll chemistry. See Stewart 
(1918, 189-208) and Willstätter (1915) for retrospectives. 
6 Throughout this paper, we provide English translations of the original German texts for the convenience 
of the reader, but owing to space constraints, we cannot include the original texts. 
7 We don’t know exactly what Tswett’s experiments involved, since the details were never published and 
no laboratory record survives. 
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334) and making a large number of observations about the optical properties of the parts 
of raw chlorophyll. 
 In 1903, Tswett published his first description of his new technique of CAA.8 The 
method was elegant. One simply filled a slender glass tube with finely ground chalk or 
sugar, dissolved the substance being analyzed in a suitable solvent (for chlorophyll, this 
was calcium disulphide or petroleum ether), and poured the results into the tube. The 
different parts of the substance would be adsorbed at different rates by the same 
adsorbent, and so, the parts would separate out in bands along the adsorbing column. 
Since chlorophyll is a pigment, the separated parts would appear as distinct bands of 
color. Following separation, Tswett would push the chalk or sugar column out of the tube 
and cut the bands apart with a scalpel. He would then redissolve each part (itself a 
compound) in its own solvent and perform a spectral analysis. 
 To our minds, Tswett faced two substantive concerns about his application of 
CAA to chlorophyll and one methodological objection to his technique independent of its 
specific application. We will discuss in subsequent sections the methodological objection 
that Tswett’s results were only supported by viciously circular appeal to his own method. 
In the rest of this section, we discuss the substantive concerns: namely, (1) that the 
sample might be chemically altered by interaction with the adsorbing material in the 
column and (2) that the sample might be oxidized during adsorption. As we will see in 
Section 2, Tswett’s response to the substantive concerns underpins a response to the 
methodological objection as well. The first substantive concern was explicitly 
                                                 
8 An English translation of Tswett’s 1903 paper was published with commentary in Hesse and Weil (1954). 
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acknowledged by Tswett, and he conducted experiments to directly address it.9 The 
second was raised by Willstätter and as far as we know Tswett was unaware of it.10 The 
two concerns are instances of a more general worry that the sample might be altered in 
some systematic way during adsorption. Tswett worried that the sample might be altered 
by chemical interaction with the adsorbent material. Willstätter worried that it might be 
altered in virtue of being adsorbed but not necessarily through chemical interaction with 
the adsorbent material.11 
 As we argue in the rest of this section, Tswett’s experiments sufficed to address 
both his own concern that there might be chemical interaction between the sample and 
the adsorbing column and also Willstätter’s concern that the sample might be oxidized 
while in a more vulnerable adsorbed state. In fact, Tswett’s experiments sufficed to 
address the general concern that the sample was altered in some systematic way during 
the adsorption analysis. Moreover, we argue that s-calibration would not have sufficiently 
addressed either of the substantive concerns. 
 In order to rule out the possibility of chemical interaction between the sample and 
the adsorbent column, Tswett (1907, 141-142) carried out three experiments. In his first 
experiment, Tswett conducted two simultaneous adsorption analyses using different 
adsorbent columns. He seems to have assumed that if the sample had chemically 
interacted with one or both of the adsorbents, then the pattern in subsequent spectral 
                                                 
9 Preliminary experiments with various solvents, adsorbates, and adsorbents are discussed in the 1903 paper 
and the experiments on chlorophyll specifically are presented in Tswett (1907b). 
10 See Willstätter (1913, 147-149) for a short summary of an allomerization process that concerned him and 
Willstätter (1913, 237-242) for his concern about oxidation. 
11 Hence, we think that Livengood (2009, 66) is wrong when he says that Tswett’s “only living doubt” was 
also expressed by Willstätter. Granted, Tswett’s doubt and Willstätter’s doubt are instances of a more 
general worry about chemical alteration of the sample during adsorption. However, the two specific 
concerns are not identical.  
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analyses would be different. However, the results of the spectral analyses were identical. 
He writes (1907b, 141): 
 Although the adsorption on CaCO3 makes the assumption of a chemical 
 modification of the chlorophyll dyes very unlikely, and the spectra just identified 
 are to be considered as ordinary dyes, I considered it necessary, for these results, 
 to control these methods as far as possible by other methods. First, CaCO3 was 
 replaced by sucrose in the capillary water-tube, on the surface of which are OH-
 ions. The results remained the same. 
 
So, Tswett concluded that the sample was not chemically altered by the adsorbent. Taken 
as a general rule, Tswett’s inference is unsound, since it is not always the case that 
different causes have different effects. However, the chemical facts in Tswett’s specific 
case justify the inference in the way that Norton (2003, 2011, 2014, forthcoming) takes 
material facts to justify inductive inferences. Calcium carbonate (CaCO3) and sucrose 
(C12H22O11) have very different chemical properties so that it would be unlikely for them 
to have identical chemical interactions with a sample. 
 Tswett’s first experiment makes it unlikely that the sample was altered by 
chemical interaction with the adsorbent column. By contrast, s-calibration would not 
have addressed Tswett’s concern. An s-calibration experiment would assure users of 
CAA that samples suitably similar to the surrogate sample could be reliably analyzed 
with the method. But in the historical circumstances, the character of chlorophyll could 
not reasonably have been assumed to be suitably similar to the character of any surrogate 
sample. Looking back at the progress in chlorophyll chemistry, Willstätter (1918, 323) 
writes: 
 Some years ago, chlorophyll was unknown as a substance in a chemical respect. It 
 was doubtful whether there was one chlorophyll or several pigments related to 
 each other, or a great number of green leaf dyestuffs. The first questions of the 
 analysis were unsolved; it was yet undecided which elements belonged to the 
 chlorophyll molecule. 
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As such, an s-calibration experiment would not have provided much assurance that 
samples of chlorophyll—possibly very different from any test sample—would be 
separated by adsorption without chemically interacting with the column. 
 Tswett’s first experiment made it unlikely that the sample was altered by chemical 
interaction with the adsorbent column. However, it was not definitive. Moreover, 
Tswett’s first experiment didn’t address Willstätter’s concern that the sample might have 
been oxidized while in its adsorbed state. Happily, Tswett conducted two further 
experiments (probably because he recognized that the first experiment still left some 
room for doubt) that did serve to address Willstätter’s concern. In his second and third 
experiments, Tswett began by conducting a spectral analysis of raw chlorophyll dissolved 
in alcoholic petroleum ether and then performing CAA to separate its parts. In the second 
experiment, he used fresh alcoholic petroleum ether to remove all of the adsorbed 
chlorophyll from the column and conducted a second spectral analysis. In the third 
experiment, he removed each separated part of the raw chlorophyll in its own alcoholic 
petroleum ether and then restored the raw chlorophyll in solution by mixing. Tswett 
concluded both experiments with another spectral analysis. In both experiments, he 
observed the same spectral absorption bands before and after the adsorption analysis. He 
writes (1907b, 141-142): 
 I further prepared chromatograms of chlorophyll on CaCO3 and extracted them 
 without decomposing them in alcoholic petroleum ether (with the addition of 
 filtered carotene). The solution showed the same absorption spectrum as the initial 
 adsorption used. In other experiments, the spectrum of the original solution was 
 prepared by mixing the isolated, spectrally-analyzed dyes. Finally, chlorophyllin 
 α, even without adsorption, was presented in small quantities: with emery and 
 CaCO3, crushed Taxus leaves were thoroughly extracted with pure petroleum 
 ether to remove the carotene as much as possible. The pulp was then extracted by 
 means of alcoholic petroleum ether and shaken with 80% alcohol to remove the 
11 
 
 xanthophylls and the chlorophyllin β, the latter being more soluble in said alcohol 
 than chlorophyllin α. Then the petroleum ether solution was shaken with stronger 
 (90%) alcohol, which absorbs most of the chlorophyllin, while the petroleum 
 ether solution mainly retained the last traces of carotene. The chlorophyllin, 
 dissolved in petroleum ether, then showed the already known spectrum, especially 
 the weak bands IV and V, in the same position and intensity. 
 
Tswett does not say explicitly, but he seems to have assumed that if two samples produce 
the same absorption bands, then they are very likely to be samples of the same substance. 
If so, his second and third experiments provided strong evidence that his samples were 
not being altered by chemical interaction with the adsorbent columns. Tswett’s 
experiments also provided strong evidence that the sample was not being altered in any 
other way. If the sample were altered by oxidation as Willstätter suggested, then the 
absorption bands in the initial spectral analysis would be different from the absorption 
bands in the final spectral analysis. Since the entire adsorption process is bracketed by the 
spectral analyses, any alteration is detectable. The specific source of the alteration makes 
no difference to the power of the experiment to detect it. 
 At the beginning of this section, we said that Tswett faced two substantive 
concerns and one methodological objection. We have explained how Tswett’s 
experiments answered the substantive concerns that the sample might be altered in some 
way during the adsorption process and why s-calibration would not have answered those 
concerns. In the next section, we turn to the methodological objection. 
 
Section 2: Marchlewski’s Challenge and the Experimenters’ Regress 
 
Beginning in 1906, Tswett carried on an extensive and bitter published exchange with 
Leon Marchlewski, a prominent chemist of the period, regarding CAA and its application 
to chlorophyll. Livengood (2009, 64) distills four distinct lines of objection in 
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Marchlewski’s part of the exchange: (1) that Tswett’s experimental results differed from 
the results obtained using entrenched techniques of partition and crystallization; (2) that 
the conclusions Tswett drew from his experimental results disagreed with entrenched 
theories of chlorophyll; (3) that CAA “did not sufficiently resemble accepted analytical 
practice”; and (4) that Tswett’s arguments for his new technique were viciously circular. 
For our purposes, the third objection may be set aside. The first two objections make the 
fourth pressing. If Tswett’s results had agreed with results obtained from entrenched 
techniques and implications of entrenched theories, that agreement would have supported 
the claim that CAA was reliable. As Livengood (2009, 66) observes, the results reported 
in Willstätter’s 1913 book should have served as a post hoc calibration of CAA, since 
Willstätter’s analysis “confirm[ed] Tswett’s results in all essentials.” But at the time of 
Tswett and Marchlewski’s exchange, the disagreement between their results required 
resolution. One had to decide which results to endorse. Of course, one need not have 
rejected the existing techniques in order to endorse Tswett’s results. If the conflicting 
results from existing techniques were due to improper use, then one could still endorse 
Tswett’s results without threatening the general reliability of the existing techniques. 
Marchlewski (1907b, 226-227) complained that endorsing the results from CAA would 
require independent evidence that the results from the entrenched techniques were 
incorrect. 
 But Mr. TSWETT not only sins in methodological terms, he uses apodictic 
 statements that have no value in science. Our results must be wrong, simply 
 because they disagree with his! Mr. TSWETT would first have to prove why the 
 criteria we use are insufficient to assess the purity of the chlorophyll we are 
 describing, and as long as he does not do so on the basis of exact experiments, I 
 must leave any further remarks in relationship to Mr. TSWETT unanswered. 
 (227) 
 
13 
 
Without independent evidence, relying solely on CAA to establish the reliability of 
CAA—as Marchlewski alleged that Tswett had done—would be viciously circular. 
 The difficulty that Marchlewski raised has a similar underlying logic to what 
Collins (1985) calls the Experimenters’ Regress (see especially 83-89 and 100-103). 
Radder (1992, 67) argues that Collins describes—but does not explicitly distinguish—
two different versions of the Experimenters’ Regress: a vicious infinite regress and a 
vicious circle.12 For our purposes, the vicious circle form of the Experimenters’ Regress 
is more important, since it is the logic of the vicious circle form that underwrites 
Marchlewski’s criticism of CAA.13 Hence, we focus on the vicious circle form and set 
aside the regress form. The vicious circle form amounts to the worry that (1) in order to 
know that an experimental apparatus, technique, or method is reliable, one needs to know 
that its deliverances are reliable but (2) in order to know that the deliverances are reliable, 
one needs to know that the apparatus, technique, or method is reliable.14 Marchlewski’s 
challenge to CAA appears to have been exactly that Tswett could not have justification 
for both (1) and (2) with respect to CAA solely on the basis of CAA itself. 
Before describing Tswett's response to Marchlewski in detail, we consider and 
reject an alternative way of trying to break the Experimenters’ Regress by appealing to 
what is sometimes called a theory of the instrument. We argue that such a theory was 
                                                 
12 Recent papers by Feest (2016) and Zuppone (2017) suggest that the two forms of the Experimenters’ 
Regress are conflated in Collins but in fact have different targets, as well as different structures. 
13 Zuppone (2017) argues that as a general rule, the regress form is subordinate to the vicious circle form 
(which she calls “general reciprocity”). 
14 We think the vicious circle form of the Experimenters’ Regress is essentially a version of a very general 
puzzle in epistemology that Chisholm (1982) calls the problem of the criterion. He writes (62), “To know 
whether things really are as they seem to be, we must have a procedure for distinguishing appearances that 
are true from appearances that are false. But to know whether our procedures [sic] is a good procedure, we 
have to know whether it really succeeds in distinguishing appearances that are true from appearances that 
are false. And we cannot know whether it does really succeed unless we already know which appearances 
are true and which ones are false. And so we are caught in a circle.” 
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unavailable to Tswett. The fact that no theory of the instrument was available to Tswett 
made Marchlewski's objection—essentially the vicious circle form of the Experimenters’ 
Regress—pressing. It also makes what Tswett ultimately did that much more impressive. 
As we’ve seen, Marchlewski demanded that Tswett provide independent reason to 
think that the results of the entrenched techniques were incorrect because he thought that 
CAA could not undermine the entrenched results on its own without vicious circularity. 
The justificatory picture that Marchlewski assumed looks like this: 
 
 
The arrows in the diagram represent a justification relation. The reliability of the 
instrument (in this case, CAA) justifies the reliability of the data, and the reliability of the 
data justifies the reliability of the instrument. Put more simply, a good instrument 
produces good data, and good data are produced by a good instrument. Hence, 
Marchlewski’s challenge shares its logical structure with the vicious circle form of the 
Experimenters’ Regress. 
 In discussing the Experimenters’ Regress, Collins supposes both that the only 
rational justification for claiming that an instrument is good is that it produces good data 
and also that the only rational justification for saying that some data are good is that they 
are produced by a good instrument. But this is an impoverished view of experimentation. 
Scientists typically have access to more than just the data and the instruments that 
produce the data. At the very least, the picture has to be complicated as follows: 
15 
 
 
 
In this picture, “theories” may be understood either widely or narrowly. Understood 
narrowly, a theory is an explicit account of the behavior of an instrument that typically 
warrants belief in the reliability of the instrument. Such a theory may be called a theory 
of the instrument. For example, optical theory provides an account of the behavior of the 
microscope and warrants belief in its reliability. Understood widely, theories include 
broad assumptions about the objects of study, experimental design, or instrumentation 
more generally. A theory in the wide sense may even include epistemic and metaphysical 
assumptions about the scientific method, laws of nature, causation, and so on. 
There are cases where no narrow theory exists—that is, cases where there is no 
explicit theory of the instrument. In such cases it is tempting to think that a genuine data-
instrument circle must arise and that the Experimenters’ Regress is a serious problem. 
Chromatography appears to be just such a case. Adsorption was not well understood 
during Tswett’s lifetime. Tswett appealed to theoretical work by Gibbs in order to justify 
the claim that the parts separated by adsorption analysis were optically and chemically 
distinct. However, Gibbs’ theoretical work was not well-suited to answering 
Marchlewski’s challenge given what was known about adsorption at the time. 
In an important paper “On the Equilibrium of Heterogeneous Systems,” Gibbs 
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(1878) derived an equation relating the concentration of a substance adsorbed on a 
surface and the surface tension at the boundary. Gibbs’ equation is as follows: 
 
When the system is at equilibrium, entropy (represented here by ηS) goes to zero and the 
density of the substance(s) Γ1...Γn adsorbed at the boundary between the adsorbent and 
the adsorbate is equal to the ratio of the surface tension at the boundary and the chemical 
potential of the adsorbate (dσ/dμi). Gibbs’ equation idealizes ordinary systems by 
assuming a homogeneous distribution of adsorbate across a geometric surface. Tswett 
(1908) cited Gibbs’ work as translated in Ostwald’s 1892 volume, Thermodynamische 
Studien.15 In a footnote Tswett explains how Gibbs’ equation connects chemical potential 
and adsorption. Tswett writes: 
Adsorption, as first discussed by GIBBS (Thermodynamic Studies, p. 271), 
is based on the pursuit of minimum surface energy at the boundary between 
a solid and a liquid. If a solute reduces the surface energy, it accumulates at 
the boundary and is adsorbed. If, therefore, we have several solutes, as in a 
petroleum-chlorophyll solution which passes through a column of powder, 
we first adsorb the one which most strongly reduces the surface energy, and 
only then, i.e. below, the next active substance is recorded; and we get as 
many different zones as there are various dissimilar surface energy-
reducing substances in solution. 
 
Clearly CAA was not entirely without theoretical foundation. But could Gibbs’ work 
have provided a theoretical background from which Tswett could answer Marchlewski’s 
challenge and escape the Experimenters’ Regress? We think not. 
First, Gibbs’ derivation was controversial during Tswett’s lifetime, and the theory 
of adsorption remained unsettled for a long time afterward. For example, Lewis (1908 
and 1909) carried out numerous empirical tests of the Gibbs equation and found that in 
                                                 
15 Livengood (2009) mentions this footnote, but identifies the wrong 1908 article. 
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many cases, the “actually determined values for Γ far exceeded the calculated values” 
(1909, 467). We find the following observation in a very detailed review of the literature 
on adsorption written nearly a decade after Tswett’s death: 
Many attempts have been made to obtain confirmation of the equation, but the 
great experimental difficulties have prevented any definite conclusion being 
reached. Donnan has recently said “the question whether the simplified form of 
the Gibbs equation yields a sufficiently accurate value for the excess surface 
concentration can scarcely be decided without further experimental evidence.”16 
 
Hence, an appeal to Gibbs’ work would not have been convincing. Tswett could, perhaps, 
have appealed to Freundlich’s (1907) empirically-derived adsorption equation or to 
Milner’s (1907) theoretical proof of Gibbs’ equation. But Tswett did not cite either of 
them and we have no reason to think that he was aware of their work. Langmuir’s (1918) 
theoretical adsorption equation came too late to be of any use to Tswett. 
 Second, a theory of adsorption is not equivalent to a theory of chromatography. 
Explicit theories of chromatography were not developed until significantly after the 
technique was rediscovered and applied by Lederer, Kuhn, and others in the 1930s. 
Having a theory of chromatography requires (at least) having a theory of solute retention 
and a theory of solute dispersion. According to Cazes and Scott (2002, p.4), “There are 
two fundamental chromatography theories that deal with solute retention and solute 
dispersion and these are the Plate Theory and the Rate Theory, respectively.” Plate theory 
was introduced by Martin and Synge in 1941 and first put into the form typically used 
today by Said in 1956. Rate theory was introduced by Amundson in work published in 
the late 1940s and early 1950s on the mathematics of adsorption in beds. The upshot is 
that there was no theory of chromatography itself until long after Tswett’s introduction of 
                                                 
16 Swan and Urqhart (1926, p.256) 
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the technique. 
Third, and most importantly, even if there had been an explicit theory of 
chromatography during Tswett’s lifetime, such a theory would not have answered all of 
the concerns raised by Marchlewski and Willstätter about alteration of the sample. A 
theory of chromatography might allay some concerns, but it wouldn’t address the most 
salient one: namely, that CAA altered chlorophyll in some way. Since an explicit theory 
of chromatography wouldn’t have lessened the worry that CAA was altering the 
chlorophyll sample, Gibbs’ much less detailed theory of adsorption wouldn’t have done 
so either. 
 
Section 3: Breaking the Regress: A Material Approach 
In the absence of an explicit theory adequate to assure skeptics that the chlorophyll 
sample was unaltered by Tswett’s technique, we think that it appeared to Marchlewski 
that CAA fell into a genuine data-instrument circle. But Marchlewski was mistaken. 
There were material facts outside the data-instrument circle available to Tswett. He could 
have appealed and we think did appeal to facts about spectroscopic analysis and chemical 
interaction in order to justify his claims about chlorophyll. In this section, we reconstruct 
the reasoning Tswett employed in more detail. We think our reconstruction is historically 
plausible, and we intend for it to be understood as a conjecture about how Tswett and 
Marchlewski reasoned about CAA and chlorophyll chemistry. However, neither Tswett 
nor Marchlewski is as explicit about his reasoning as we would like, and as far as we 
know, there are no surviving laboratory notes or letters that might give us insight beyond 
the published record. Our reconstruction is informed by the whole pattern of 
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argumentation in Tswett (1903, 1906a, 1906b, 1906c, 1906d, 1907a, 1907b, 1907c, 
1907d, 1907e, 1908a, 1908b, 1908c, 1908d, 1908e, 1908f, 1908g, 1910, 1911a, 1911b, 
and 1911c), Marchlewski (1902, 1906a, 1906b, 1907a, 1907b, 1907c, 1908a, 1908b, 
1908c, 1908d, 1911), and Jacobson and Marchlewski (1912a and 1912b). But we have 
found it difficult to isolate short passages that clearly support each step that we take. We 
encourage curious and skeptical readers to look closely at Tswett and Marchlewski’s 
papers, to raise specific challenges to our reconstruction, and to frame a plausible 
alternative. 
 In reconstructing Tswett’s reasoning, we have been inspired by Norton’s material 
theory of induction (see Norton 2003, 2011, 2014, forthcoming), according to which 
there is no universally-applicable, purely formal rule of inductive inference and no global 
fact (such as the “fact” that nature is uniform) that warrants every inductive inference. 
Rather, each inductive inference is powered by a local matter of fact. We find that paying 
attention to local matters of fact throws substantial light on the debate between Tswett 
and Marchlewski. As we have already said, we intend our reconstruction to be read as a 
conjecture about what actually happened in a specific moment in the history of science. 
However, at least some interesting theoretical claims may be made on the basis of our 
account understood as a merely possible, rational reconstruction of the case. For example, 
we want to say that actual working scientists sometimes appeal to local matters of fact in 
order to break the Experimenters’ Regress. To support that claim, we need a plausible 
account of what actually happened. But in order to support the weaker modal claim that 
scientists could break the Regress by appealing to local matters of fact (without a robust 
theory of an instrument and without conducting any s-calibration experiments), our 
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account merely needs to possible. 
We take Tswett’s central argument to be for the claim that all raw chlorophyll has 
the parts {C1, C2, …, CN} in the fixed proportions {P1, P2, …, PN}.17 The argument 
proceeds from the character of a sample of chlorophyll as follows: 
[A1] (tacit, background assumption) Samples of chlorophyll are exchangeable 
with respect to how many parts the sample has and the proportions in which those 
parts occur; that is, what is true of one sample is true of every sample. 
 
[A2] This sample of chlorophyll has the parts {C1, C2, …, CN} in the proportions 
{P1, P2, …, PN}. 
=================== (therefore inductively)  
[A3] Every sample of chlorophyll has the parts {C1, C2, …, CN} in the 
proportions {P1, P2, …, PN}. 
 
[A1] is either a generalization for inductive inference or a universal claim in a deductive 
argument. Here we present it as the former. In either case, the evidence for [A1] is a 
material fact that is part of chemical theory in the wide sense: two samples of the same 
substance are exchangeable with respect to their chemical properties. This is a “material 
fact” in Norton’s sense of the term. Tswett initially appealed to CAA in order to justify 
[A2], e.g. in his claim that “chromatographic analysis is qualified to finally determine the 
degree of [the] complexity [of chlorophyll]” (1906d, 388).18 The sub-argument for [A2] 
runs as follows:  
[B1] CAA separates this sample of chlorophyll into the parts {C1, C2, …, CN} 
having proportions {P1, P2, …, PN}. 
 
[B2] If so, then this sample of chlorophyll has the parts {C1, C2, …, CN} in the 
proportions {P1, P2, …, PN}.  
                                                 
17 Most of the exchange between Tswett and Marchlewski deals with chlorophyll in the strict sense, 
meaning Tswett’s chlorophyll-α and chlorophyll-β. Tswett (1908c, 1352) claimed that the two chlorophylls 
occur in ether solution in the ratio 5:1. Citing that paper, Jacobson and Marchlewsi (1912, 221) say that 
Tswett maintained the view “that the two are always present in the ratio of 1:5.” Of course, Tswett 
recognized that the raw chlorophyll included xanthophylls and carotenes as well. So, the claim we are 
attributing to Tswett is an abstracted schema that we think he would have endorsed. 
18 See also, Tswett (1906c, 322). 
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———————————— 
[A2] This sample of chlorophyll has the parts {C1, C2, …, CN} in the proportions 
{P1, P2, …, PN}. 
 
We present the sub-argument for [A2] as deductive, but one might construe it as a 
broadly inductive argument by weakening or qualifying the premisses as needed. 
Marchlewski’s version of the Experimenters’ Regress challenged [B2] by 
emphasizing that Tswett did not know whether the sample was chemically altered during 
the adsorption process. We take the objection to have this form:19 
[M1] If we don’t know whether the sample was chemically altered during the 
process of CAA, then we should not endorse [B2]. 
 
[M2] We don’t know whether the sample was chemically altered during the 
process of CAA. 
———————————— 
[M3] We should not endorse [B2]. 
 
The claim that the sample was being altered during the adsorption process was a 
reasonable provisional hypothesis explaining the difference in results between the 
entrenched techniques and Tswett’s new technique. A cautious approach would tend to 
favor the entrenched techniques and Marchlewski’s explanation. 
                                                 
19 The are several ways one might characterize this argument. First, we may alter the target of 
Marchlewski’s objection. On our view the target isn’t CAA itself, but about whether Tswett is warranted to 
accept [B2] given what he knows about CAA. There may be reasons to prefer an objection that attacks B2 
directly, although this appears more faithful to the objection Marchlewski actually leveled against Tswett. 
Second, we may alter the strength of the objection. On the one hand, we might interpret the objection as 
about the mere possibility of the sample’s being altered. This interpretation would replace premise [M1] 
with, “If it is possible that the sample was chemically altered…” Such an objection seems far too 
demanding if one has in mind metaphysical or even physical possibility. On the other hand, we might 
interpret the objection as about only some “live hypotheses” relevant to alteration of the sample. In this 
case [M1] would focus on whether we’ve eliminated relevant alternative explanations for the results. This 
seems more plausible but is weaker than our reconstruction above.  
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 Tswett responded by arguing directly for the disputed conditional [B2] and 
supporting his argument with experimental evidence that chlorophyll samples were 
unaltered by his application of the adsorption process. We think he reasoned as follows:20 
[C1] If CAA doesn’t chemically alter the parts of chlorophyll during separation, 
then [B2]. 
 
[C2] CAA doesn’t chemically alter the parts of chlorophyll during separation. 
———————————— 
[B2] If CAA separates this sample of chlorophyll has the parts {C1, C2, …, CN} 
having proportions {P1, P2, …, PN}, then this sample of chlorophyll has the parts 
{C1, C2, …, CN} in the proportions {P1, P2, …, PN}. 
 
Premiss [C1] is taken to be a part of the background chemical theory to which Tswett can 
appeal. That is, [C1] was among the material facts that were accepted by chemists and 
botanists at the time.21 After all, if CAA doesn’t chemically alter the substances it is 
intended to separate, there is no reason to be suspicious of its results. Premiss [C2] is 
what Tswett sets out to support.22 How could he be sure that the chlorophyll wasn’t being 
chemically altered during analysis? Tswett appealed to material facts about chemical 
interaction and spectral analysis. His first experiment yields the following argument: 
[D1] CAA of chlorophyll using chalk as an adsorbent yields the same 
spectroscopic results as CAA of chlorophyll using sugar as an adsorbent. 
 
[D2] If so, then CAA doesn’t chemically alter the parts of chlorophyll during 
separation. 
 ———————————— 
[C2] CAA doesn’t chemically alter the parts of chlorophyll during separation. 
 
                                                 
20 See especially Tswett (1906c, 319) and Tswett (1906d, 386). 
21 Some version of [C1] is likely to be accepted by all experimentalists: if an experimental technique 
doesn’t confound a result, then if the technique produces some result, then the result is the case. 
22 See Tswett (1906a, 319) on chemical interactions between chlorophyll and various solvents and Tswett 
(1906b, 386) for interactions between chlorophyll and absorbents. And see especially, Tswett (1907b, 141), 
where he describes his calibration experiments. 
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Tswett’s first experiment and the corresponding argument above are not entirely 
adequate. The argument effectively assuages the worry that the chlorophyll chemically 
interacts with the adsorbent, but it doesn’t rule out the possibility that the chlorophyll is 
altered in some other way, e.g. by interacting with atmospheric oxygen while adsorbed, 
as Willstätter worried. Tswett’s second and third experiments are more successful. We 
lay out the argument as follows: 
[E1] A spectroscopic analysis conducted before CAA and a spectroscopic analysis 
conducted after CAA yield identical results. 
 
[E2] If so, then CAA doesn’t chemically alter the parts of chlorophyll during 
separation. 
———————————— 
[C2] CAA doesn’t chemically alter the parts of chlorophyll during separation. 
 
Here, the experimental result is given in [E1], and [E2] depends on two background 
chemical facts: (1) no chemical alteration of the chlorophyll that occurred during the 
adsorption process would be reversed by re-dissolving the chlorophyll and (2) 
spectroscopic analysis would detect any chemical differences between the initial sample 
in solution and the final sample in solution. Again, these were background facts that 
botanists and chemists accepted. 
 Tswett’s experiments did not show that CAA was reliable with respect to all 
mixtures whatsoever, but they achieved something quite remarkable nonetheless. Tswett 
provided a method for testing the reliability of CAA for each mixture to be analyzed. 
Given an unknown sample, one could repeat Tswett’s experiments to check whether 
adsorption analysis altered samples of that type. Compare Tswett’s achievement to s-
calibration. The hope with s-calibration is to establish the general reliability of the 
calibrated technique by showing that it correctly separates a sample of known 
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composition. But it would have been good enough in Tswett’s case if s-calibration could 
have been used to establish that CAA was reliable with respect to chlorophyll. One might 
offer the following argument: 
[F1] CAA doesn’t chemically alter the parts of a known test sample during 
separation. 
 
[F2] If so, then CAA doesn’t chemically alter the parts of chlorophyll during 
separation. 
 ———————————— 
[C2] CAA doesn’t chemically alter the parts of chlorophyll during separation. 
  
The problem, though, is that for [F2] to be plausible, the test sample needs to be 
(relevantly) chemically similar to the target raw chlorophyll sample. If the test sample is 
chemically very different from raw chlorophyll, then the inference is precarious. In the 
case of a sample of essentially unknown character, the fact needed to secure [F2] is 
simply unavailable.  
 An anonymous referee wondered whether Tswett could have appealed to some 
other facts in order to make use of s-calibration to argue for [C2]. If so, then our claim 
that s-calibration could not have used s-calibration to show that CAA worked with 
respect to chlorophyll. We think this is unlikely. Consider the following plausible-
looking approach. Although very little was known about raw chlorophyll, Tswett’s 
contemporaries did know that raw chlorophyll is a mixture of very unstable organic 
pigments and that the entire mixture is insoluble in water but soluble in ether. Perhaps 
Tswett could have used another mixture of organic pigments as a surrogate and argued as 
follows: 
 [G1] CAA doesn’t chemically alter the parts of this mixture of organic  
  pigments during separation. 
 
 [G2]  If so, then CAA doesn’t chemically alter the parts of chlorophyll during  
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  separation. 
 -------------------------- 
 [C2] CAA doesn’t chemically alter the parts of chlorophyll during separation. 
However, in order to confirm [G1], Tswett would have needed to know the chemical 
character of at least one organic pigment (or better, pigment mixture) that could have 
been assumed to be not-too-different in relevant respects from the parts of chlorophyll. 
Some organic pigments were well-understood by the early 1900s. For example, Baeyer 
had described the structure of alizarin and indigo in the 1860s and 1870s.23 However, the 
pigments with known structures were comparatively simple, much more stable, and 
unlike chlorophyll in some chemically important ways, such as being soluble in water but 
not in ether. Better surrogate organic pigments, such as carotin, hemoglobin, and lutein 
were not well-understood at the time. Carotin was investigated using CAA in the late 
1910s by the American chemist Leory Palmer.24 Hemoglobin, which has an extremely 
similar chemical structure to chlorophyll α, was being studied at around the same time as 
chlorophyll. Interestingly, Marchlewski, in collaboration with another Polish scientist, 
Marceli Nencki, had established the close chemical relation between chlorophyll and 
hemoglobin by showing that they had very similar decomposition products.25 But the 
structure of hemoglobin was not determined until the x-ray crystallography work by Max 
Perutz et al. (1960), so it could not have been used as a surrogate. Similarly, the structure 
of lutein was not well-understood until the work of Richard Kuhn in the 1930s.26 So, we 
think Tswett would not have found the G-argument congenial. Of course, this is only one 
                                                 
23 See Nagendrappa (2014). 
24 See Ettre and Zlatkis (1979) for discussion of some (re)discoveries of chromatography after Tswett, and 
see Ettre and Wixom (1993c) for discussion of Palmer specifically. 
25 See Skarzynski (1946). 
26 See Orna (2013, 124-125). 
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possible route to securing [C2] by way of s-calibration. Perhaps there are other routes that 
would work better, but we do not know of any plausible ones. Hence, we maintain that s-
calibration would not have served Tswett’s aim or broken the Regress. 
In this section we’ve suggested that Tswett had some material facts available to 
him that were powerful enough to justify his technique. Furthermore, the calibration 
experiments Tswett performed were sufficient to answer the objections Marchlewski 
raised and to break the Experimenter’s Regress. However, these experiments do not meet 
the orthodox definition of calibration in Collins (1985), Franklin (1994, 1997), etc. In the 
next section we address calibration directly. 
 
Section 4: Calibration 
The orthodox view among philosophers, at least until recently, appears to be that 
calibration just is s-calibration. With some recent exceptions that we will discuss later in 
this section, every account of calibration we know of says that a calibration experiment 
for an instrument or method uses some input of known character to show that the 
instrument or method gives the correct output for some of the inputs in its scope. These 
experiments then support the claim that the instrument or method will likewise give the 
correct output for a novel input. Collins (1985, 105) writes: “Calibration is the use of a 
surrogate signal to standardize an instrument. The use of calibration depends on the 
assumption of near identity of effect between the surrogate signal and the unknown signal 
that is to be measured (detected) with the instrument.” Franklin (1994) disputes Collins’ 
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account of the measurement of gravity waves and presents an alternative version of 
events but does not dispute Collins’ account of calibration.27 Franklin (1997, 31) writes: 
Calibration, the use of a surrogate signal to standardize an instrument, is an 
important strategy for the establishment of the validity of experimental 
results. If an apparatus reproduces known phenomena, then we legitimately 
strengthen our belief that the apparatus is working properly and that the 
experimental results produced with that apparatus are reliable. 
 
Writing about the (alleged) use of intuitions as evidence in philosophy, Cummins (1998, 
116-117) gives a similar account: 
Every scientific subdiscipline spends a good deal of effort identifying and 
correcting errors and artifacts. What is important for present purposes is that 
an observational technique is deemed acceptable just to the extent that it can 
be relied upon to produce accurate representations or indicators of its 
targets. This is why observational procedures in general, and instruments in 
particular, have to be calibrated. When Galileo pointed his newly devised 
telescope at the moon and saw mountains—earthlike blemishes on what 
should have been a perfect celestial object—it was legitimate for the 
opposition to inquire whether the apparent mountains were artifacts. The 
proper response was to point the telescope at something of known size, 
shape, distance, color, and so on to determine what distortions it introduced; 
to calibrate it, in short. 
 
And the orthodox view that calibration just is s-calibration seems to be the standard view 
among working scientists, as well.28  
 Tswett’s case gives us some reason to want a broader account of calibration: one 
that does not simply identify calibration with s-calibration. Tswett was able to break the 
Experimenters’ Regress by relying on facts about chemical interaction and spectral 
analysis that were in the common ground for chemists of his time, not by appealing to a 
                                                 
27 Whereas Collins argues that no calibration experiment can provide independent support for the adequacy 
of the surrogate signal (and hence, that calibration fails to provide an escape from the Regress), Franklin 
argues that physicists thought carefully about the adequacy of the surrogate signal and had good 
(experimental) reasons for thinking that it was a good surrogate. 
28 For evidence, consider the definition of “calibration” in the International Vocabulary of Metrology report 
by the International Bureau of Weights and Measures. 
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detailed theory of chromatography or by conducting an s-calibration experiment. We 
think it is plausible to regard Tswett’s experiments as calibrating CAA. But as we’ve 
seen, Tswett’s experiments do not involve a surrogate signal. He did not establish the 
reliability of CAA with respect to some samples of known character and then infer that 
the technique would also apply to chlorophyll. Rather, he conducted experiments that 
directly established the reliability of CAA as applied to chlorophyll. Here, then is a 
simple argument that some calibration experiments are not s-calibration experiments. 
 [H1] Tswett’s experiments served to calibrate CAA. 
 
 [H2] If [H1], then either Tswett’s experiments involved a surrogate signal or  
  some calibration experiments are not s-calibration experiments. 
 
 [H3] Tswett’s experiments did not involve a surrogate signal. 
 -------------------------- 
 [H4] Some calibration experiments are not s-calibration experiments. 
 
We think that [H2] and [H3] will be accepted by everyone. But one might worry that 
[H1] is question-begging. We think that [H1] is a naïve, pre-theoretical categorization 
judgment and as such is not question-begging with respect to any theory of calibration. 
However, we do acknowledge that [H1] is a rather thin support. Here, then, is an 
alternative argument that rests on rather different grounds: 
 [J1] If calibration just is s-calibration, then either Tswett could not have  
  calibrated CAA with respect to chlorophyll or calibration of CAA with  
  respect to chlorophyll could not have fulfilled any of its epistemic  
  functions. 
 
 [J2] Tswett could have calibrated CAA with respect to chlorophyll. 
 -------------------------- 
 [J3] If calibration just is s-calibration, then calibration of CAA with respect to  
  chlorophyll could not have fulfilled any of its epistemic functions. 
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We think that it should always be possible to calibrate an instrument or technique in a 
way that fulfills the epistemic functions of calibration. But if so, then calibration is not 
just s-calibration.  
 A third argument motivated by our first two proceeds as follows. We have 
appealed to a categorization judgment in our first argument, but we expect that judgment 
to be controversial. Hence, we are motivated to find a more widely-acceptable way to 
constrain theories of calibration. Inspired by our second argument, we think that a 
plausible way to constrain theorizing about calibration is to focus on its epistemic 
functions. If one accepts that a good account of calibration should make sense of its 
epistemic functions, then one will be inclined to accept a broader account of calibration 
to the degree that a broader account does a better job making sense of the epistemic 
features of calibration. 
 At this point we want to highlight the ends that calibration serves according to 
Collins, Franklin, and Cummins in the passages we quoted earlier in this section. For 
Collins, calibration is primarily about standardization, which is very important for 
communication within and across laboratories. For Franklin, calibration is about 
establishing that an instrument is functioning properly and that experimental results are 
valid. For Cummins, it’s about identifying and excluding artifacts and errors. Paying 
attention to the epistemic function of calibration suggests that surrogate signals are 
incidental to calibration. What matters is that an experiment promotes standardization, 
facilitates successful communication across research laboratories, establishes that an 
instrument is functioning properly, allows for the identification and exclusion of artifacts 
and errors, and generally ensures that an instrument is reliable. With our constraint in 
30 
 
mind, we propose to think of calibration in the following way: An experiment is a 
calibration experiment if it is designed to establish that an instrument or technique does 
what it is supposed to do.29  We now develop our proposal by comparing it with 
accounts of calibration from the recent literature. Current discussion of calibration in 
philosophy appears somewhat sporadic. While we have not conducted any empirical 
studies of philosophers’ views on calibration, we have found evidence that some 
philosophers of measurement endorse something like the orthodox view. For example, 
Soler and colleagues (2013) develop a framework for calibration in established contexts 
using standardized instruments. In such a context, calibration tests are of two kinds: blank 
tests, where a measurement is performed “in the absence of any object” of the relevant 
type in order to detect noise (e.g. the tare weight of a scale or allowing an empty balance 
to come to equilibrium), and “etalon” tests, where the instrument is applied to an etalon, 
which the authors use as a technical term for “a metrologically certified measurement 
standard or an object with sufficiently well-known and stable properties” (289) and the 
results are compared against the etalon’s value.30 
An account that is much closer to the one we present comes from Perovic (2017, 
317), who says that “any combination of experimental techniques that ensures the proper 
functioning of the apparatus based on already-known phenomena may be characterized 
as calibration.” (emphasis in original) We agree that calibration is ultimately aimed at 
establishing that an instrument is functioning properly. As we read him, what separates 
                                                 
29 An experiment is a successful calibration experiment if it actually establishes that an instrument or 
technique does what it is supposed to do. For those who want “calibrate” to be a success term, drop 
“design” from our account and make adjustments as necessary. 
30 The VIM the French translation of “calibration” is “étalonnage” meaning more directly something like 
the act of étalon-ing or “standardizing.” 
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Perovic’s account from ours is the phrase “already-known phenomena,” which we take to 
require a comparison between the deliverances of an instrument to be calibrated and 
something independently known about the target of application for the instrument. For 
example, one might point a telescope at an object whose basic properties are already 
known by way of direct perception, as we saw Cummins suggest earlier, or one might 
point a microscope at a disc whose markings are already known because they are 
manufactured, as Hacking (1983, 203) argues. Hence, we read Perovic as offering an 
orthodox account. 
 Other recent accounts of calibration dispense with surrogate signals and 
measurement standards, defining calibration in terms of what they take to be 
characteristic aims, instead. For example, Tal (2017, 33) defines calibration as a process 
of identifying parameter values in a measurement model. He writes: 
Calibration is a special kind of modelling activity where the system being 
modelled is a measurement process. The primary aim of calibration is to 
identify which parameter values in the model [of a measurement process] 
coherently and accurately predict the final states of the measurement 
process. 
  
This account, Tal says, differs from several others “in its emphasis on coherence and 
predictive accuracy as the central aims of calibration, and in deemphasizing the epistemic 
role of measurement standards” (44). We agree with Tal that deemphasizing 
measurement standards and other surrogate signals is an important step in understanding 
calibration, but we think that by focusing on measurement his view does not correctly 
identify the characteristic aim of calibration in general: establishing that an instrument 
does what it is supposed to do. 
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 Similarly, when discussing procedures for calibrating newly invented instruments, 
Soler (2015, 105) writes: 
In practices dedicated to the invention of new instrumental devices, as in 
any other type of scientific practices, calibration minimally refers, at the 
most general level, to the achievement of a reliable instrument-token 
(typically a measurer) regarding some mesuranda. 
 
Soler’s account here is very close to ours. But there is a difference that turns on how one 
understands the phrase “reliable instrument-token.” Since Soler is talking about reliability 
regarding some mesuranda, we understand an instrument-token to be reliable if it is 
highly likely that the instrument accurately represents the thing being measured.31 On our 
view, calibration establishes that an instrument does what it is supposed to do. We often 
want our instruments to deliver sufficiently accurate measurements with high probability. 
Consequently, in those cases our account says the same thing as Soler’s. However, an 
instrument might do exactly what it’s supposed to do without delivering accurate 
measurements with high probability. Let’s illustrate the difference with some examples. 
 Consider a device that is supposed to produce a random integer in the range from 
1 to 100. An experimenter uses this instrument when randomly sampling from a target 
population. And an experimenter might get evidence confirming or disconfirming the 
claim that for any number in the range, the probability that the device outputs that 
number is 1/100 (or at least close to it). To calibrate the device is not to show that it is 
accurately measuring anything. The numbers delivered by the instrument are not 
                                                 
31 Later in Soler’s essay she discusses cases in which a new instrument is being actively developed. She 
refers to these as NewLI practices (for New Local Instruments). However, in such cases she says that 
calibration is a demonstration that “the instrumental outputs of the new instrument cohere with what is 
already taken for granted in the present stage of scientific development” (emphasis in original). As we’ve 
discussed above coherence with alternative separation techniques was unavailable to Tswett and would 
have only been another instance of s-calibration. 
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measurements. But the experimenter still wants to know that the device is doing what it is 
supposed to do. We might say that the experimenter wants to know that the instrument 
reliably produces a random number. But in saying this, we should not be understood as 
saying that the experimenter wants to know that with high probability, the device 
accurately represents something that is being measured. Rather, we should be understood 
as saying that with high probability the instrument does what it is supposed to do, i.e. 
generate a number in the range from 1 to 100 such that for any number in that range, the 
probability of that number being generated is 1/100. 
 The randomizer is a special case of a larger category of instruments that we might 
call producers or generators, which are calibrated by establishing that they generate what 
they are supposed to generate. For example, calibrating a laser might involve establishing 
that it outputs coherent light at a specific (intended) wavelength. Or suppose that an 
experimenter designs a device to “knock” a system out of equilibrium at regular intervals 
by impressing a specific (intended) force to an object in the system. As with the 
randomizer, we aren’t trying to establish that these devices are accurately measuring 
anything. The experimenter need not use these devices to measure anything in order to be 
interested in knowing that the instrument generates the output it is supposed to generate. 
From Tswett’s work it is clear that what CAA is supposed to do is separate the 
component parts of chlorophyll without chemically altering them in any way. Tswett’s 
technique does not measure the parts of chlorophyll. That step comes later, when Tswett 
separates and weighs the bands produced in the adsorbent column or when he performs 
spectral analysis on the component parts to identify their chemical structure. The 
separation technique is supposed to separate the parts of chlorophyll effectively and 
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without alteration. The experiments that Tswett performed demonstrate that this is, in 
fact, what his technique does and it’s for this reason that we consider them to be 
calibration experiments. 
Section 5: Conclusion 
Let’s take stock. We have seen that recognizing the threat of the Experimenters’ Regress 
has value in scientific inquiry insofar as it pushes investigators to show that their 
techniques work as advertised and to do so in ways that avoid falling into the Regress. 
The work Tswett performed to justify CAA in the face of objections by Willstätter and 
Marchlewski was valuable for this reason. However, we have seen no reason to think that 
the Regress is an unavoidable epistemic sink. The Experimenters’ Regress is not the basis 
of a sound skeptical argument. Rather, we have seen how to break the Regress by appeal 
to background theoretical principles, often in the form of local material facts. We 
reflected on Tswett’s example and what it can tell us about calibration more generally. 
And finally, we defended the view that an experiment is a calibration experiment if it 
establishes that an instrument or method does what it is supposed to do. 
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